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TIMOTHY R. POWELL 
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust: 
Congressional Intent Interpreted Through a Plain 
Reading of the Federal Bankruptcy Code 
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (“Franklin III”),1 the Supreme 
Court analyzed whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Puerto Rico”) is a 
“State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision of 11 U.S.C. § 903.2 The Court 
held that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision but is a 
“State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision, and therefore federal law pre-
empts the Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act Recovery Act 
(“Recovery Act”).3 While the Supreme Court Majority correctly came to its holding 
by interpreting the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code,4 First Circuit Judge Torruella5 
and the Dissenting Justices in Franklin III provide their own interesting 
interpretations of the issue at hand.6 
I. THE CASE 
In May of 1941, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority Act 
(“Authority Act”) which created the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 
(“PREPA”) and authorized PREPA to issue bonds.7 The Authority Act explicitly 
 
© 2017 Timothy R. Powell 
           Timothy R. Powell will be graduating from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law in May of 2018. He received his bachelors from the University of Texas at Austin. He would like to thank 
his fellow editors of the Journal of Business & Technology Law for their guidance and support. 
 1.  136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 2.  Id. at 1942. 
 3.  Id. at 1949. 
 4.  Id. at 1946. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 6.  See infra Part III.B. 
 7.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment 
entered, No. 14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, §§ 191–239 
(2012)). 
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guaranteed PREPA bondholders “that [Puerto Rico] will not limit or alter the rights 
or powers hereby vested in [PREPA] until all such bonds at any time issued, together 
with the interest thereon, are fully met and discharged”8 and expressly gave PREPA 
bondholders the right to appoint a receiver if PREPA defaults on any of its bonds.9 
On January 1, 1974, PREPA issued the bonds underlying the matters in this case 
pursuant to a trust agreement (“Trust Agreement”)10 with U.S. Bank National 
Association as Successor Trustee.11 Amongst other obligations, the Trust Agreement 
contractually requires PREPA to pay principal and interest on bonds promptly and 
secures bondholders’ bonds by a pledge of PREPA’s present and future revenues.12 
Additionally, the Trust Agreement prohibits PREPA from creating a lien equal to or 
senior to bondholders’ liens on these revenues.13 Furthermore, in the event of a 
default, the Trust Agreement permits bondholders to accelerate payments, seek the 
appointment of a receiver as guaranteed in the Authority Act, and sue to enforce the 
terms of the Trust Agreement.14 The Trust Agreement provides that an event of 
default may occur when PREPA institutes a proceeding “for the purpose of effecting 
a composition between [PREPA] and its creditors or for the purpose of adjusting the 
claims of such creditors pursuant to any federal or Commonwealth statute now or 
hereafter enacted.”15 
In June of 2014, the House of Representatives and the Senate of Puerto Rico 
approved, and the Governor of Puerto Rico signed into law, the Recovery Act to 
address the state of fiscal emergency concerning the potential insolvency of some of 
Puerto Rico’s public corporations, including PREPA.16 Puerto Rico modeled the 
 
 8.  Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 215). 
 9.  Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 207). 
 10.  Id. The Trust Agreement was amended and supplemented through August 1, 2011. Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment 
entered, No. 14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Trust Agreement § 701). 
 13.  Id. (citing Trust Agreement § 712). 
 14.  Id. (citing Trust Agreement §§ 802–804). 
 15.  Id. (quoting Trust Agreement § 802(g)). 
 16.  Id. at 583–84 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, § A). Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act to 
ameliorate the fiscal situations of several of its public corporations, including PREPA, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct 
and Sewer Authority (“PRASA”), and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”), 
whose combined debt totaled twenty billion dollars. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 
322, 331 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin 
California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. 
of Motives, § A). Traditionally, the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (“GDB”) provided financing 
to enable Puerto Rico’s public utilities to continue operating without defaulting on their debt obligations, but the 
GDB was facing its own financial crisis at the time the Recovery Act was created. Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016). 
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Recovery Act after Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, which “governs the 
adjustments of debts of a municipality,”17 because, as will be discussed in detail in 
Section III(A), Puerto Rico’s municipalities are expressly prohibited from filing 
under Chapter 9.18 Unless expressly prohibited from doing so, a U.S. municipality 
may adjust its debts under Chapter 9, but only with specific authorization from its 
state.19 Additionally, the Title 11 definition of “municipality” in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code includes a public agency or instrumentality of the state, like 
PREPA.20 
The Recovery Act established two procedures for Puerto Rico’s public 
corporations to restructure their debts21 and created the Public Sector Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act Courtroom (“Special Court”) to “preside over 
proceedings and cases brought pursuant to these two procedures.”22 The first 
restructuring procedure, as explained in Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act, provides that, 
with authorization from the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico 
(“GDB”), an eligible public corporation may propose “amendments, modifications, 
waivers, and/or exchanges to or of a class of specified debt instruments” to seek debt 
relief from its creditors.23 “If creditors representing at least fifty percent of the debt 
in a given class vote on whether to accept the changes, and at least seventy-five 
percent of participating voters approve, then the [S]pecial [C]ourt may issue an order 
approving the transaction and binding the entire class.”24 The second restructuring 
procedure, as set forth in Chapter 3 of the Recovery Act, provides that, again with 
authorization from the GDB, an eligible public corporation may submit a 
restructuring plan petition to the Special Court that lists the amounts and types of 
claims that will be affected as well as submits a proposed restructuring plan or 
proposed transfer of the public corporation’s assets.25 This procedure mirrors Chapter 
9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code in that it involves “a court-supervised restructuring 
process intended to offer the best solution for the broadest group of creditors.”26 If 
 
 17.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, § E; 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.). 
 18.  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)). 
 19.  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)). 
 20.  11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). 
 21.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, §§ A, E). 
 22.  Id. (citing Recovery Act § 109(a)). 
 23.  Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 201(b), 202(a)). This relief included changing interest rates or the maturity 
date of bondholders’ debts. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 
1943 (2016) (citation omitted). 
 24.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act §§ 115(b), 202(d), 204). 
 25.  Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 301(d), 310). 
 26.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing 2014 P.R. Laws 371, 448–49). 
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the plan meets certain requirements,27 the Special Court may confirm the plan, 
thereby binding all of the public corporation’s creditors to the proposed 
restructuring.28 
Following the passage of the Recovery Act, the Plaintiffs, two groups of 
bondholders collectively holding nearly two billion dollars of bonds issued by 
PREPA, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 
against Puerto Rico (“District Court”), PREPA, agents of the GDB (in their official 
capacity), the Governor of Puerto Rico Alejandro Garcia-Padilla (in his official 
capacity), and the Attorney General/Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico Cesar 
Miranda-Rodriguez (in his official capacity) to declare the Recovery Act 
unconstitutional and enjoin its implementation.29 The first group of Plaintiffs, 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust30 and Oppenheimer Rochester31 (collectively 
referred to as the “Franklin Plaintiffs”), filed their original complaint on June 28, 
201432 and their second amended complaint33 as well as their cross-motion for 
 
 27.  Including the requirement that “at least one class of affected debt has voted to accept the plan by a 
majority of all votes cast in such class and two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected debt in such class that 
is voted.” Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (quoting Recovery Act § 315(e)). 
 28.  Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 315(e), 115(c)). It should also be noted that Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act 
permits a suspension period and that Chapter 3 permits an automatic stay, both of which prevent creditors from 
asserting claims or exercising contractual remedies against the public corporation debtor. Id. (citing Recovery 
Act §§ 205, 304). 
 29.  Id. at 584–86, 586 n.3; Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). Both groups of Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico’s 
Governor, Alejandro Garcia-Padilla, and agents of the GDB, but only the Franklin Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico 
itself and PREPA itself, while only the BlueMountain Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Justice, Cesar 
Miranda-Rodriguez. Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 326 n.3. 
 30.  Delaware corporations or trusts that collectively hold approximately $692,855,000 of PREPA bonds. 
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶ 3); see id. at 584 n.1 
(referencing all of the parties encompassed by the Franklin California Tax-Free Trust plaintiffs). 
 31.  Delaware statutory trusts that collectively hold approximately $866,165,000 of PREPA bonds. Id. at 
585 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶ 4); see id. at 585 n.2 (referencing all of the parties encompassed 
by the Oppenheimer Rochester plaintiffs). 
 32.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325. 
 33.  The Franklin Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief on multiple claims: (1) that the Recovery Act is pre-
empted by 11 U.S.C. § 903 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; (2) that the Recovery Act violates the Bankruptcy 
Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) that §§ 108, 115, 202, 312, 315, and 325 of the Recovery Act 
specifically “violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution by impairing the contractual 
obligations imposed by the Authority Act and the Trust Agreement;” (4) that the Recovery Act violates the 
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution by taking plaintiffs’ contractual right to seek the appointment 
of a receiver without just compensation; (5) that § 304 of the Recovery Act “unconstitutionally authorizes a stay 
of federal court proceedings when a public corporation files for debt relief pursuant to the Recovery Act.” 
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment entered, No. 
14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
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summary judgment34 on August 11, 2014.35 The second group of Plaintiffs, 
BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC (“BlueMountain Plaintiffs”)36 
(collectively, the Franklin Plaintiffs and the BlueMountain Plaintiffs will be referred 
to as the “Plaintiffs”), filed their original complaint on July 22, 201437 and their 
amended complaint on August 12, 2014.38 Both groups of Plaintiffs argued that the 
enactment of the Recovery Act impaired the contractual obligations between PREPA 
and PREPA’s bondholders, as laid out in the Trust Agreement and the Authority Act, 
by annulling certain protections and rights that were promised.39 These impaired 
protections and rights include: (1) that PREPA’s rights would not be altered until all 
PREPA bonds were fully satisfied and discharged;40 (2) that bondholders have the 
right to seek the appointment of a receiver if PREPA defaults;41 (3) that PREPA will 
not create a lien equal to or senior to the bondholder’s lien on PREPA’s present or 
future revenues;42 (4) that the bondholders have a right to accelerate payment if 
PREPA defaults;43 and (5) that PREPA is deemed in default if it institutes a 
 
136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 
582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶¶ 58–71). 
 34.  The Franklin Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was in regards to their pre-emption and stay of 
federal court proceedings claims. Id. at 585-86 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 78). 
 35.  Id. at 585-86. 
 36.  A Delaware company that holds more than $400,000,000 of PREPA bonds. Id. at 586 (citing Civil No. 
14-1569, Docket No. 20 at ¶ 6). 
 37.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 38.  The BlueMountain Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief on multiple claims: (1) that the Recovery Act is 
pre-empted by the Federal Bankruptcy Code; (2) that the Recovery Act violates the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
United States Constitution; (3) “that the Recovery Act impairs the contractual obligations imposed by the 
Authority Act and the Trust Agreement and therefore violates the contract clauses of the United States and Puerto 
Rico constitutions;” (4) that §§ 205 and 304 of the Recovery Act “unconstitutionally authorize a stay of federal 
court proceedings when a public corporation files for debt relief pursuant to the Recovery Act.” Franklin I, 85 F. 
Supp. 3d at 586 (citing Civil No. 14-1569, Docket No. 20). 
 39.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325. 
 40.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 215). Plaintiffs allege that the 
Recovery Act altered PREPA’s rights thereby eliminating Puerto Rico’s express guarantee. Id. 
 41.  Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 207). Cf. Authority Act § 17 and Trust Agreement § 804 with 
Recovery Act § 108(b). 
 42.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing Trust Agreement § 712). Plaintiffs allege that the Recovery 
Act permits PREPRA to obtain credit secured by a lien that is senior to the Plaintiffs’ lien. See id. at 590, 590 
n.8; Recovery Act §§ 129(d), 206(a), 322(c). 
 43.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing Trust Agreement § 803). Plaintiffs allege the Recovery Act’s 
suspension provision, stay provision, and post-plan approval provision eliminate Plaintiffs right to accelerate 
payments. See id. at 590 & 590 n.9; Recovery Act §§ 205, 304, 115(b)(2), 115(c)(3). 
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proceeding “for the purpose of effecting a composition between [PREPA] and its 
creditors or for the purpose of adjusting the claims of such creditors.”44 
Both groups of Plaintiffs “sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 
that the Recovery Act is pre-empted by the federal Bankruptcy Code, violates the 
Contract[] Clause, violates the Bankruptcy Clause, and unconstitutionally authorizes 
a stay of federal court proceedings.”45 On August 20, 2014, the District Court 
consolidated the briefing schedules of both Plaintiffs’ cases, Civil Case Nos. 14-1518 
and 14-1569, but did not merge the suits into a single cause of action or change the 
rights of the parties because the individual cases had multiple, relevant distinctions.46 
On September 12, 2014, the Puerto Rican Defendants47 filed a motion to dismiss the 
Franklin Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, opposed the Franklin Plaintiffs’ 
cross-motion for summary judgment, and moved to dismiss the BlueMountain 
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, alleging that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are unripe 
and fail on the merits, as a matter of law.48 PREPA joined the Puerto Rican 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Franklin Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint 
and opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment.49 Additionally, PREPA 
filed its own motion to dismiss arguing that the Franklin Plaintiffs lacked standing 
and that their claims were unripe.50 On February 6, 2015, after the Franklin Plaintiffs 
and the BlueMountain Plaintiffs opposed the Puerto Rican Defendants’ motions51 
 
 44.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590-91 (citing Trust Agreement § 802(g)). Plaintiffs allege the Recovery 
Act expressly renders this Trust Agreement ipso facto clause unenforceable. See id. at 590-91 & 591 n.10; 
Recovery Act § 325(a). See also Recovery Act § 205(c). 
 45.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). The Franklin Plaintiffs also brought a Takings Claim under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments while the BlueMountain Plaintiffs brought an additional Contract Clause Claim 
under the Puerto Rican Constitution. Id. 
 46.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 586 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 92; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket 
No. 26). The cases were not merged because: (1) the Franklin Plaintiffs brought suit against Puerto Rico and 
PREPA while the BlueMountain Plaintiffs only brought suit against Puerto Rico; (2) only the Franklin Plaintiffs 
brought a Takings Clause Claim; (3) only the BlueMountain Plaintiffs brought a Puerto Rico Constitution 
Contract Clause Claim. Id. 
 47.  The Puerto Rican defendants include: Puerto Rico, the Governor of Puerto Rico (Alejandro Garcia-
Padilla), the Attorney General/Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico (Cesar R. Miranda Rodriguez), and the GDB 
agents (Melba Acosta and John Doe). Id. at 586 n.3. 
 48.  Id. at 586-87 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 95, mem. at Docket No. 95-1; Civil No. 14-1569, 
Docket No. 29, mem. at Docket No. 29-1). 
 49.  Id. at 587 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 97 at p. 1). 
 50.  Id. (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 97). 
 51.  Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 587 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 102; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket 
No. 41). 
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and the Puerto Rican Defendants and PREPA replied,52 the District Court issued an 
order and opinion in both cases.53 
In analyzing the claims and motions before it, the District Court looked at the text, 
history, purpose, and context of the clauses, especially the pre-emption clause of 11 
U.S.C. § 903(1), and ultimately held that the Recovery Act was pre-empted by 
federal law and permanently enjoined its enforcement.54 The District Court also 
denied the motion to dismiss the Contract Clause claim, denied the motion to dismiss 
one of the Franklin Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claims, dismissed without prejudice 
all claims asserted against PREPA for lack of standing, and dismissed without 
prejudice the remaining claims for lack of ripeness.55 Subsequently, the Puerto Rican 
Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit “from 
the permanent injunction, the grant of summary judgment to the Franklin plaintiffs,56 
and further argue[d] that the District Court erred by reaching the Contract[] Clause 
and Takings Claims in its February 6 order.”57 
The First Circuit reasoned that the primary legal issue on appeal in this case was 
whether 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) pre-empted the Recovery Act and further stated that this 
issue turns on whether the amended definition of “State”58 in the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code renders 11 U.S.C. § 903(1)’s pre-emptive effect inapplicable to Puerto Rico.59 
Ultimately, the First Circuit concluded, based on a lack of legislative history to read 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code otherwise, that the amendment did not remove Puerto 
Rico from the scope of the pre-emption provision and affirmed the District Court’s 
holding that the pre-emption provision barred the Recovery Act.60 Furthermore, the 
First Circuit opined that only Congress had the authority to decide whether Puerto 
Rico’s municipalities could seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief.61 The Supreme Court 
of the United States granted the Defendants’ petitions for writs of certiorari.62 
 
 52.  Id. (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 108-09; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket No. 44). 
 53.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 326, 326 n.4. 
 56.  Id. at 327. The grant of summary judgment was only in regards to the pre-emption claim of the Franklin 
Plaintiffs. Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 614. 
 57.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 327. 
 58.  See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(j)(6), 
101(44), 98 Stat. 333, 338-39 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)). “The post-1984 definition of ‘State’ 
includes Puerto Rico, ‘except’ for the purposes of ‘defining’ a municipal debtor under § 109(c).” Franklin II, 805 
F.3d at 325 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(52), 109(c)) (emphasis added). 
 59.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325. 
 60.  Id. at 336-37. 
 61.  Id. at 337 & 345. 
 62.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016). 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States bankruptcy system has evolved since its initial enactment. As the 
necessity for newer and better bankruptcy laws developed throughout the years, 
Congress used its constitutional authority to establish and amend these laws.63 To 
understand why Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act and whether it was 
constitutional, it is necessary to look at the text and history of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code, specifically three provisions: the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway provision, the 11 
U.S.C. § 903(1) pre-emption provision, and the 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) definition of 
“State.”64 
A. The Early History of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, the Development of the 
Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme, and the Origin of the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) 
Gateway Provision 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish uniform Laws on Bankruptcy 
throughout the United States.65 In 1800, Congress first exercised this power by 
enacting a series of temporary bankruptcy Acts which led to a permanent bankruptcy 
scheme in 1898.66 Initially, it was presumed that “constitutional limitations precluded 
either level of government, state or federal, from enacting a municipal bankruptcy 
regime.”67 This is so because municipalities are government entities, and thus the 
methods for addressing their insolvency are more limited than the procedures for 
addressing corporate or individual insolvency.68 In the beginning, states couldn’t 
enact a municipal bankruptcy regime without allegedly violating the Contract 
Clause, and the federal government couldn’t do so without violating the states’ rights 
to control their own municipalities under the Tenth Amendment.69 However, in 1933 
and out of necessity due to the Great Depression, Congress began developing a 
municipal bankruptcy scheme by enacting what came to be the precursor to Chapter 
 
 63.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 64.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016). 
 65.  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 66.  Id. (citing An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541, 
30 Stat. 544; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902)). 
 67.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 327 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (1993)). 
 68.  Id. (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426–50 (1993)); see also id. at 327 n.5. 
 69.  Id. at 327–28 (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426-28 (1993)); see also id. at 327 n.6. 
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9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code which gave the states “a mechanism for addressing 
municipal insolvency that they could not create themselves.”70 
Since the inception of these federal municipal bankruptcy laws, Congress has tried 
to preserve the States’ powers over their municipalities.71 In Ashton v. Cameron 
County Water Improvement Dist. No. One,72 the Supreme Court struck down 
Congress’ first attempt to enable the states’ municipalities to file for federal 
bankruptcy relief by concluding that the statute infringed the States’ powers “to 
manage their own affairs”73 and thereby violated the Tenth Amendment.74 In 1937, 
Congress amended its 1933 statute to avoid this Tenth Amendment problem by 
requiring a state’s consent in the federal municipal bankruptcy regime 
before permitting municipalities of the state to seek relief under it, and in 
part by emphasizing that the statute did not effect “any restriction on the 
powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their 
sovereign rights and duties.”75 
The Supreme Court upheld the 1937 amended statute in United States v. Bekins76 
because it believed the amended statute appropriately balanced federal and state 
power by requiring that the state first authorize its instrumentality to seek relief under 
the federal bankruptcy laws.77 The Bekins ruling is the origin of the 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c) state-authorization requirement, also known as the “gateway provision,” 
which requires a state to “authorize [its] municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 




 70.  Id. at 328 (citing McConnell & Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427-29, 450–54 (1993)). 
 71.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 72.  Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 73.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531). 
 74.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 328. 
 75.  Id. (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–54 (1938) (citation omitted)). 
 76.  United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–54 (1938). 
 77.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47–49, 53–54). The requirement that states 
give their municipalities consent to seek relief under the federal bankruptcy laws both creates a cooperative state-
federal Chapter 9 scheme and “promotes sovereignty by preventing municipalities from strategically seeking (or 
threatening to seek) federal municipal relief to ‘reduce the conditions that states place on a proposed bailout.’” 
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 329 (quoting C.P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285–86 (2012)). 
 78.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
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11 U.S.C. § 109. Who may be a debtor 
*       *       *       *        
 
(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if 
such entity— 
(1) is a municipality; 
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, 
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental 
officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity 
to be a debtor under such chapter. . .79 
*       *       *       *     
B. The Evolution of the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme, How it Applies to 
the States, and the Congressional Enactment of the 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) Pre-emption 
Provision 
In 1946, the federal bankruptcy laws evolved again to bar states from enacting their 
own municipal bankruptcy schemes.80 In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled in Faitoute 
Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park81 that “federal bankruptcy laws did not pre-empt 
New Jersey’s municipal bankruptcy scheme, which required municipalities to seek 
relief under state law before resorting to the federal municipal bankruptcy scheme.”82 
In response to Faitoute, Congress enacted Section 83(i) in 1946 which overturned 
Faitoute and expressly pre-empted state municipal bankruptcy laws.83 Congress 
sought to preserve Section 83(i) when it re-codified it, with some changes, in 1978 
 
 79.  11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 80.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944–45. 
 81.  Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 82.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 507-09 
(1942)). 
 83.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 334–35 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Act of July 1, 1946, Pub.L. No. 481, Ch. 532, sec. 83(i), 60 Stat. 
409, 415). Section 83(i), as enacted in 1946, read as follows: 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of any State to 
control, by legislation or otherwise, any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such 
State . . . Provided, however, That no State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness 
of such agencies shall be binding upon any creditor who does not consent to such composition, and 
no judgment shall be entered under such State law which would bind a creditor to such composition 
without his consent. 
Act of July 1, 1946, Pub.L. No. 481, ch. 532, sec. 83(i), 60 Stat. 409, 415. 
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as 11 U.S.C. § 903(1), also known today as the “pre-emption provision.”84 The 
modern pre-emption provision reads as follows: 
11 U.S.C. § 903. Reservation of State Power to Control Municipalities 
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by 
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise 
of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including 
expenditures for such exercise, but— 
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of 
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition; and 
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does 
not consent to such composition.85 
C. The History of the Definition of “State” in the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
The third provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code at issue in this case is the 
definition of “State,” which has included territories in its definition since the first 
Federal Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898, the same year Puerto Rico became a 
territory of the United States.86 However, “when Congress re-codified the bankruptcy 
laws to form the Federal Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the definition of ‘State’” was left 
out of the definitions section.87 In response to this omission, which was not the 
primary purpose of the Act,88 Congress amended the Federal Bankruptcy Code in 
1984 to reincorporate the definition of “State,” as codified in 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).89 
“The amended definition includes Puerto Rico as a State for purposes of the Code 






 84.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 335 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989 at 110). Congress felt this re-codification was 
necessary “to maintain the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws be preventing states from ‘enact[ing] their own 
versions of Chapter [9].’” Id. (quoting L.P. King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old and New; Chapter IX 
Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 65 (1976)). 
 85.  11 U.S.C. § 903. 
 86.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing 30 Stat. 545). The 1898 Federal Bankruptcy Act definition of 
“State” also included “the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia.” Id. (citing 30 Stat. 545). 
 87.  Id. (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2549–2554). 
 88.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 330 n.11. 
 89.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing § 421, 98 Stat. 368–69). 
 90.  Id. 
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11 U.S.C. § 101. Definitions 
In this title the following definitions shall apply: 
*       *       *       * 
(52) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 
of this title.91 
*       *       *       * 
 
This exception, which was not in previous versions of the definition of “State,” 
“deprived Puerto Rico of the power to grant its municipalities the authorization 
required by § 109(c)(2) to file for Chapter 9 relief.”92 Franklin III, as will be 
discussed later, centers around “whether this change was also meant to transform the 
preemption provision of § 903(1) without Congress expressly saying so.”93 
D. Puerto Rico and Its Relationship to the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme 
Puerto Rico has been able to issue bonds, and authorize its municipalities to issue 
bonds, since 1917.94 However, if Puerto Rico’s municipalities can’t meet their bond 
obligations, they, like state municipalities, are excluded from bankruptcy relief under 
the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.95 Additionally, “from 1938 until the 
modern Bankruptcy Code was introduced in 1978, Puerto Rico, like the states, could 
authorize its municipalities to obtain federal municipal bankruptcy relief.”96 While 
the definition of “State” was left out of the Code from 1978 to 1984, most scholars 
agree that this did not affect Puerto Rico’s right to authorize its municipalities to seek 
bankruptcy relief.97 However, when Congress re-introduced the definition of “State” 
 
 91.  11 U.S.C § 101(52). 
 92.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 331. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
 93.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 331. 
 94.  Id. at 329 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 3, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. 
§ 741)). 
 95.  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109). 
 96.  Id. at 329-30 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(29), 403(e)(6) (1938); 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1934); Bekins, 304 U.S. at 
49, accord 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(29), 404 (1976); 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1976); see also S.J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the 
Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 572 (2014)). Puerto Rico’s power to provide state authorization, 
which was required for plan confirmation, was derived from (1) the Bankruptcy Act’s definition of “State,” in 
effect from 1938–1978, which defined “State” to include territories and (2) the extension of United States laws 
to Puerto Rico. Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 329 n.9. 
 97.  Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 330 (citing Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1998); In re Segarra, 
14 B.R. 870, 872–73 (D.P.R. 1981)); see also Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 330 n.10. 
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in 1984, it defined “State” to include Puerto Rico as it had before 1978, but it also 
added the phrase, “except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under 
chapter 9 of [the Bankruptcy Code].”98 As a result, Puerto Rico was expressly, 
though indirectly, deprived of the right to authorize its municipalities to file for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).99 Put differently, 
Puerto Rico could not file for Chapter 9 without first obtaining congressional 
approval.100 Without the ability to authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 
relief, and facing an imminent fiscal crisis, Puerto Rico took matters into its own 
hands and enacted its own municipal bankruptcy laws, the Recovery Act, “to cover 
the purported gap created by the 1984 amendment.”101 The Recovery Act permitted 
Puerto Rico’s municipalities, who were not authorized for federal Chapter 9 relief, 
“to seek Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 relief, either simultaneously or sequentially, with 
approval from the GDB.”102 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
constitutionality of the Recovery Act based on the aforementioned Bankruptcy Code 
provisions.103 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Franklin III, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit by holding that federal law pre-empts the Recovery 
Act.104 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Thomas supported his holding 
by analyzing the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code.105 Justice Sotomayor, with whom 
Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented.106 
A. The Majority Argues that the Plain Wording of the Bankruptcy Code Provides 
for Congress’ Intent 
The Majority began its review by discussing the facts and procedural history of the 
case.107 In particular, the Majority focused on the text and history of three provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code that are necessary to decide whether Puerto Rico is a “State” 
 
 98.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 330-31 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(52); compare id., with Act of June 22, 1938, 
Pub. L. No. 696, ch. 575, § 1(29), 52 Stat. 840, 842). 
 99.  Id. at 331. “Puerto Rico now lacks the power it once had been granted by Congress to authorize its 
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 relief.” Id. at 325. 
 100.  Id. at 331. 
 101.  Id. at 331–32. 
 102.  Id. at 332. (citing Recovery Act, §§ 112, 201(b), 301(a)). 
 103.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016) 
 104.  Id. at 1949. 
 105.  Id. at 1946. 
 106.  Id. at 1949. 
 107.  Id. at 1942–43. 
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for purposes of the pre-emption provision.108 These three provisions include: (1) the 
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) “gateway provision,” (2) the 11 U.S.C. § 903 “pre-emption 
provision,” and (3) the 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) definition of “State.”109 The Majority 
identified the issues in this case as 
whether, in light of the amended definition [of “State”], Puerto Rico is 
no longer a “State” only for purposes of the gateway provision, which 
requires States to authorize their municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief, 
or whether Puerto Rico is also no longer a “State” for purposes of the 
pre-emption provision.110 
The Majority noted and both parties agreed that, prior to the 1984 amendment, 
Puerto Rico was considered a “State” for purposes of the Chapter 9 pre-emption 
provision.111 Therefore, it is clear that, prior to 1984, federal law would have pre-
empted the Recovery Act because the Recovery Act would have violated 11 U.S.C. 
§ 903(1).112 However, in this case, the parties have conflicting interpretations of how 
the 1984 amendment to the definition of “State” altered, if at all, the pre-emption 
provision.113 Petitioners (“Puerto Rican Defendants”) interpret the amended 
definition of “State” to entirely exclude Puerto Rico from all of Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.114 Respondents (“Plaintiffs”) interpret the amended definition of 
“State” to preclude Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter 
9 relief through the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway provision but nonetheless to include 
Puerto Rico for purposes of the pre-emption provision.115 The Majority ultimately 
holds that it agrees with Respondents’ interpretation of how the amended definition 
of “State” affects Puerto Rico in Chapter 9 bankruptcy.116 
Principally, the Majority opined that the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code should 
begin and end its analysis.117 11 U.S.C. § 903 contains an express pre-emption clause 
 
 108.  Id. at 1944. 
 109.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016) 
 110.  Id. at 1945. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. “[F]ederal law would have pre-empted the Recovery Act because it is a ‘State law prescribing a 
method of composition of indebtedness’ for Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities that would bind nonconsenting 
creditors.” Id. 
 113.  Id. at 1945–46. 
 114.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). If 
Petitioners’ interpretation is correct, the pre-emption provision would not apply to Puerto Rico which would 
allow them to “enact their own municipal bankruptcy scheme without running afoul of the code.” Id. 
 115.  Id. If Respondents’ interpretation is correct, then the pre-emption provision applies to Puerto Rico and 
“bars it from enacting the Recovery Act.” Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
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and therefore provides Congress’ pre-emptive intent.118 The amended definition of 
“State” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) provides a singular exception which unmistakably 
refers only to the 11 U.S.C. § 109 gateway provision.119 The Majority interprets 
“Congress’ use of the ‘who may be a debtor’ language in the amended definition of 
‘State’ to mean that Congress intended to exclude Puerto Rico from the gateway 
provision delineating who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.”120 Therefore, the 
Majority determines that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway 
provision, and as a result, Puerto Rico’s “municipalities cannot satisfy the 
requirements of Chapter 9’s gateway provision until Congress intervenes.”121 
However, Puerto Rico is no less a state for purposes of the pre-emption provision 
than it was before the amended definition was enacted in 1984 because the Code has 
prohibited “States” from enacting their own municipal bankruptcy schemes for 
seventy years.122 “Had Congress intended to ‘alter th[is] fundamental detai[l]’ of 
municipal bankruptcy, [the Supreme Court] would expect the text of the amended 
definition to say so.”123 
Additionally, the Majority weighed in on each of the Dissent’s arguments, noting 
that the Dissent adopted many of the Petitioners’ arguments.124 First, the Dissent 
argued that “the exclusion of Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway 
provision effectively removed Puerto Rico from all of Chapter 9.”125 The Majority 
disagrees with this argument by providing that if Congress had intended to exclude 
Puerto Rico entirely from Chapter 9, it would have specifically articulated that fact 
rather than merely excluding it from only the gateway provision of 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c).126 Second, the Dissent argues that the pre-emption provision cannot apply to 
Puerto Rico because it is a part of Chapter 9.127 The Majority again disagrees with 
this argument because it relies on the fact that Puerto Rico is excluded entirely from 
Chapter 9, which it is not.128 Separately, the GDB also raises an argument that neither 
the Majority nor the Dissent adopt because it would nullify the pre-emption provision 
 
 118.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (quoting 
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011)). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1946 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis 
City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 1947 (citing 60 Stat. 415 (overturning Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 507–09)). 
 123.  Id. (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
 124.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016). 
 125.  Id. at 1947 (citation omitted). 
 126.  Id. at 1947–48. 
 127.  Id. at 1948. “Because Puerto Rico’s municipalities are ineligible for Chapter 9 relief, Chapter 9 cannot 
‘affec[t] Puerto Rico’s control over its municipalities,’ according to the Dissent.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 128.  Id. at 1948–49. 
POWELL_Puerto_Rico_v._Franklin_California_Tax-Free_Trust (DO NOT DELETE) 1/2/2018 3:50 PM 
 PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE TRUST 
132 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
altogether.129 However, the Court ultimately held that Puerto Rico is a “State” for 
purposes of the pre-emption provision and therefore the Recovery Act is pre-empted, 
affirming the lower court rulings.130 
B. The Dissent Argues that “[t]he structure of the Code and the language and 
purpose of [11 U.S.C.] § 903 demonstrate that Puerto Rico’s municipal debt 
restructuring law should not be read to be prohibited by Chapter 9” 
First, the Dissent disagrees with the Majority’s holding and instead align themselves 
with the Petitioner’s reading of the amended definition of “State” which would 
entirely exclude Puerto Rico from Chapter 9.131 The Dissent begins by opining that 
the crippling debt of Puerto Rico’s three main public utilities, including PREPA, will 
soon lead to the failure of vital public services.132 Correcting this type of situation is 
precisely what the bankruptcy system is intended for, and since Congress excluded 
Puerto Rico’s municipalities from the federal municipal bankruptcy scheme in 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, Puerto Rico was merely employing a remedy 
available to it.133 The Dissent argues that Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act, 
which resembled Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, to allow Puerto Rico’s utilities 
to restructure their debts while continuing to provide these vital public services.134 
Second, the Dissent went into detail on how the structure of the Bankruptcy Code 
supports its position.135 The Dissent argues that while bankruptcy is not a one-size-
fits-all process, the Bankruptcy Code is a governing body of law for different types 
of entities that seek its protection.136 All entities have to initially pass through the 
gateway provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 109 to then be subject to a relevant chapter of the 
Code.137 Once governed by a specific chapter, the interested parties are only 
governed by that chapter and the Bankruptcy Code chapters that apply to all cases.138 
The Majority ignores this reading and argues that since the amended definition in 11 
 
 129.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1948–49 (2016). 
 130.  Id. at 1949. 
 131.  Id. at 1949 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 132.  Id. at 1949–50. These vital public services include utilities’ abilities to provide electricity, safe drinking 
water, road maintenance, and public transportation. Id. at 1950. 
 133.  Id. at 1950 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(52), 109(c)). 
 134.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1950 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 135.  Id. at 1950–53. 
 136.  Id. at 1950. 
 137.  Id. at 1951. “Once an entity meets the eligibility requirements for a specific “gateway” set out in § 109 
and elects to pass through that gateway, it becomes subject to the relevant chapter of the Code – 7, 9, 11, 12, or 
13.” Id. 
 138.  Id. (citing 1 RICHARD LEVIN & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRUPTCY CODE 
59 (Collier Pamphlet ed. 2015) (“[A]s a general rule, the provisions of the particular chapter apply only in that 
chapter.”)). 
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U.S.C. § 101(52) prevents Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to file for 
Chapter 9, these municipalities are therefore prevented from satisfying the 
requirements of the 11 U.S.C. § 109 gateway provision and ultimately filing for 
Chapter 9 relief without congressional intervention.139 However, the Dissent believes 
that since Puerto Rico cannot pass through the gateway of 11 U.S.C. § 109, the pre-
emption provision of 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) should also not apply to them.140 
Third, the Dissent focuses on the context of the statutory provision of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 903.141 The Dissent reasoned that “Section 903 delineates the balance of power 
between the States that can authorize their municipalities to access Chapter 9 
protection and the bankruptcy court that would preside over any municipal 
bankruptcy commenced under Chapter 9.”142 However, since Puerto Rico cannot 
pass through the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway to Chapter 9, the Dissent argues that 
this distribution between the State and the bankruptcy court is irrelevant and none of 
Chapter 9 should then apply to Puerto Rico, including the pre-emption provision in 
11 U.S.C. § 903(1).143 Because of the structure of the code,144 the amendment to 11 
U.S.C. § 101(52) excludes Puerto Rico and its municipalities from 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c)’s gateway, ultimately excluding Puerto Rico and its municipalities from 
Chapter 9 for all purposes.145 Ultimately, the Dissent believes that 11 U.S.C. § 903 
is directed at states that can approve their municipalities for Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
and therefore it should not pre-empt Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act.146 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Franklin III, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court and First Circuit by 
holding that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision but is 
a “State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision, and therefore federal law pre-
empts the Recovery Act.147 The Majority reached its holding by focusing on the plain 
 
 139.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1951 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 140.  Id. at 1952. “Section 903 by its terms presupposes that Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the 
power to authorize their municipalities to invoke its protection.” Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. (citing United States v. Morrow, 266 U.S. 531, 534–35 (1925)). 
 144.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1952–53 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “[W]ords of a statute must be read in their context and with a view of their place in 
the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation 
omitted). 
 145.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 146.  Id. at 1953–54. 
 147.  Id. at 1949. 
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language of the Bankruptcy Code,148 while the Dissent provided a policy argument 
focusing on the entire structure of the Code and the implications such a holding 
would have on the citizens of Puerto Rico.149 Additionally, First Circuit Judge Juan 
Torruella provided a unique view that comes to the same conclusion as the Majority 
through his claims that the 1984 Amendments are invalid all-together.150 However, 
where there are no uncertainties or ambiguities in the statutory language of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Court must hold in favor of such language and disregard 
arguments contrary to the plain interpretation of federal statutes and inquiries into 
congressional intent in drafting such statutes.151 
A. The Majority’s Plain, Textual Reading of the Bankruptcy Code Begins and Ends 
the Analysis 
In Franklin III, the Supreme Court correctly held that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act is 
pre-empted by federal law.152 Justice Thomas, writing for the Majority, appropriately 
provided that the “plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends [the] 
analysis.”153 In doing so, the Court cited three cases, two of which involve federal 
pre-emption, supporting their finding that the plain meaning of a statute or clause 
provides the best evidence of Congress’ intent:154 (1) United States v. Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Inc.;155 (2) Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. 
Whiting;156 and (3) Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.157 
i. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. 
In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court had to resolve 
whether 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code “entitles a creditor to receive 
postpetition interest on a nonconsensual oversecured claim allowed in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”158 There are two types of secured claims: (1) voluntary secured claims, 
 
 148.  Id. at 1946. 
 149.  Id. at 1954 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 150. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 346 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 
582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), 
and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring). 
 151.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 152.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 153.  Id. at 1946. “Resolving whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ or purposes of the pre-emption provision begins 
‘with the language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where the inquiry should end,’ for ‘the statute’s language 
is plain.’” Id. (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989). 
 156.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011). 
 157.  Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
 158.  Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 237. 
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which are created by agreement between the creditor and debtor and which are called 
“security interests” by the Bankruptcy Code;159 and (2) involuntary secured claims, 
such as judicial or statutory liens, which are fixed by operation of law and which do 
not require a debtor’s consent.160 Because some courts of appeals had drawn a 
distinction between these two types of secured claims for purposes of determining 
postpetition interest, the Court had to answer “whether Congress intended that all 
oversecured claims be treated the same way for purposes of postpetition interest.”161 
To do so, the Court merely looked at the language of the statute itself.162 
Precedent holds that resolving a dispute over the meaning of a statute begins with 
the language of the statute itself,163 and in some cases, as in Ron Pair Enterprises, 
the meaning of the language of the statute itself is where the inquiry should end.164 
The only time the plain meaning of the statute itself is not conclusive is in “rare cases 
[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at 
odds with the intentions of its drafters.”165 In such rare cases, the intention of the 
drafters controls.166 Because allowing postpetition interest on nonconsensual 
oversecured liens does not contravene the Bankruptcy Code drafters’ intent, does not 
conflict with any other section of the Bankruptcy Code, does not conflict with any 
important state or federal interest, and does not have a contrary view suggested by 
its legislative history,167 the Court, after carefully reviewing the syntax and grammar 
of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), concluded that “[t]he language before us expresses Congress’ 
intent—that postpetition interest be available—with sufficient precision so that 
reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is hardly necessary.”168 
ii. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting 
In Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether federal immigration law pre-empts certain provisions of a recently enacted 
Arizona statute.169 The Court provided that federal immigration law, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), expressly pre-empts “any State or local law 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
 
 159.  Id. at 240 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1982 ed., Supp.IV)). 
 160.  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(32) and (47) (1982 ed., Supp.IV)). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 241. 
 163.  Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)). 
 164.  Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) 
(“[T]he sole function of the courts is to enforce [a statute] according to its terms.”)). 
 165.  Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 485 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 242–43. 
 168.  Id. at 241–42. 
 169.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011). 
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upon those who employ. . .unauthorized aliens.”170 Additionally, the Court provided 
that Arizona’s statute, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, stated that (1) the licenses of 
state employers who knowingly employ unauthorized aliens may be suspended or 
revoked, and (2) Arizona employers must use a federal electronic verification system 
to confirm that their employees are legally authorized workers.171 To address the 
question before them, the Court began by looking at the plain wording of the federal 
clause.172 
After laying out the facts and procedural history, the Court first analyzed the 
Petitioner’s argument that IRCA expressly pre-empts Arizona’s statute.173 When 
federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, the Court “focus[es] on the plain 
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent.”174 The Court found that while IRCA expressly pre-empts some 
state powers when dealing with the employment of unauthorized aliens, it also 
expressly preserves other rights to which Arizona’s licensing law falls within the 
confines.175 Because the Court found that Arizona’s law fell within the plain text of 
IRCA, the Court did not feel the need to address, in depth, the Petitioner’s argument 
that the legislative history of IRCA supports Petitioner’s interpretation.176 Second, 
the Court looked at whether Arizona’s law was impliedly pre-empted by federal 
law.177 The Court was not swayed by either of Petitioner’s arguments regarding the 
existence of implied pre-emption in this case, and ultimately held that Arizona’s law 
is not pre-empted by federal law.178 Supreme Court precedents “establish that a high 
threshold must be met if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the 
purposes of a federal Act.”179 
iii. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
In Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
federal law pre-empted a Vermont statute aimed at requiring employers to disclose 
payments relating to health care claims and other information relating to health care 
services.180 The Court noted that the pre-emption clause of the federal law at issue, 
 
 170.  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2)). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 594. 
 173.  Id. at 587–600. 
 174.  Id. at 594 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 
 175.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600 (2011). 
 176.  Id. at 599 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(Congress’s “authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history.”)). 
 177.  Id. at 600–11. 
 178.  Id. at 611. 
 179.  Id. at 607 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)). 
 180.  136 S. Ct. 936, 940 (2016). 
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), had been 
addressed by the Court before, and the text of ERISA’s express pre-emption clause 
was the essential starting point.181 Precedent held that ERISA pre-empts two 
categories of state laws: (1) “[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively 
upon ERISA plans. . .or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s 
operation. . ., that ‘reference’ will result in pre-emption;”182 and (2) “ERISA pre-
empts a state law that has an impermissible ‘connection with’ ERISA plans, meaning 
a state law that ‘governs. . .a central matter of plan administration’ or ‘interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration.’”183 Because Vermont’s law imposed duties 
that were “inconsistent with the central design of ERISA, which is to provide a single 
uniform national scheme for the administration of ERISA plans without interference 
from laws of the several States even when those law, to a large extent, impose parallel 
requirements,” the Court held that ERISA pre-empted and invalidated Vermont’s 
reporting statute as applied to ERISA plans.184 
In its analysis, the Court provided that “[P]re-emption claims turn on Congress’s 
intent.”185 The Court further noted that a state law is only relevant regarding the 
“scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive”186 or “the nature of 
the effect of a state law on ERISA plans.”187 The Court was not swayed by any of 
the arguments of Respondent, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and ultimately 
held that Vermont’s law, as it applied to ERISA plan, was pre-empted by federal law 
because “[a]ny presumption against pre-emption, whatever its force in other 
instances, cannot validate a state law that enters a fundamental area of [federal] 
regulation and thereby counters the federal purposes in the way [the Vermont] state 
law does.”188 
iv. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III) 
In Franklin III, as in Chambers and Gobeille, the Court concluded that the statute 
contained an express pre-emption clause and therefore they did not need to invoke 
any presumption against pre-emption.189 Where a statute contains an express pre-
emption clause, courts must “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which 
 
 181.  Id. at 943. 
 182.  Id. (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). 
 183.  Id. (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)). 
 184.  Id. at 947. 
 185.  Id. at 946 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650 (1995)). 
 186.  Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 (2016) (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655). 
 187.  Id. (quoting Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). 
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necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”190 Here, the 
amended definition of “State” clearly only excludes Puerto Rico for the “purpose of 
defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”191 As the Majority notes, 
that exception clearly refers to the gateway provision in 11 U.S.C. § 109, which is 
titled “who may be a debtor.”192 Because Congress used the specific language “who 
may be a debtor” in the amended definition of “State,” and 11 U.S.C. § 109 is titled 
“who may be a debtor,” the Majority appropriately interpreted Congress’ intent so as 
to only exclude Puerto Rico from the gateway provision.193 “Similarity of 
language . . . is . . . a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari 
passu.”194 Additionally, this is not one of those rare cases, as mentioned in Ron Pair, 
where the plain meaning of the statute itself is inconclusive, and therefore the drafters 
intent controls.195 “There is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean what the 
language of the statute says.”196 Furthermore, the legislative history regarding the 
1984 amendment does not reveal any helpful alternative interpretations.197 
Regardless, “reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s 
unambiguous language.”198 Therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that 
Puerto Rico was pre-empted from enacting the Recovery Act because Puerto Rico is 
not considered a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision (i.e. Puerto Rico 
cannot authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief).199 
While the Dissent provided a few textual and policy arguments in favor of the 
Recovery Act, the Majority’s reading of the Bankruptcy Code is the correct 
interpretation.200 The Dissent argued that, when read in context of the entire 
Bankruptcy Code, “Section 903 by its terms presupposes that Chapter 9 applies only 
to States who have the power to authorize their municipalities to invoke is protection” 
and “[b]ecause Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot pass through the § 109(c) 
gateway to Chapter 9, nothing in the operation of a Chapter 9 case affects Puerto 
 
 190.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563, 594 U.S. 582 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 191.  11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012). 
 192.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam). 
 195.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). 
 196.  Id. at 246. 
 197.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 337 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); see also Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 198.  Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) (quotations omitted); see also Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory 
text that is clear.”). 
 199.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
 200.  Id. at 1949–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
POWELL_Puerto_Rico_v._Franklin_California_Tax-Free_Trust (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018 3:50 PM 
 TIMOTHY R. POWELL 
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 139 
Rico’s control over its municipalities.”201 The Majority correctly shoots down this 
argument by providing that the finding that “Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes 
of the gateway provision . . . says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for 
the other provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.”202 The Majority points out 
that it is the debtors themselves and not the states who pass through the gateway 
provision.203 Here, the debtors would be the municipalities.204 “[I]f it were Congress’ 
intent to [] exclude Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of th[e] pre-emption 
provision, it would have said so.”205 Furthermore, the Dissent’s argument that “the 
government and people of Puerto Rico should not have to wait for possible 
congressional action to avert the consequences of unreliable electricity, 
transportation, and safe water,” is a policy argument that does not trump the plain 
wording of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.206 However, Congress has already taken 
action, as will be discussed in Section IV.C, infra. 
B. Judge Juan Torruella’s Concurrence in the Judgment of Franklin II Provides a 
Unique Perspective into the Validity of the Recovery Act Based on the Validity of 
the 1984 Amendments Themselves 
First Circuit Judge Juan Torruella filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in 
Franklin II, agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that “the 1984 Amendments are 
the ‘key to this case.’”207 While he agreed that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act 
contravenes 11 U.S.C § 903(1) and thus is invalid, he went further to claim the 1984 
Amendments themselves are equally invalid.208 The amendments are invalid in that 
they establish bankruptcy legislation that “is not uniform with regard to the rest of 
the United States, thus violating the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 
Clause of the Constitution,”209 and that they also “contravene both the Supreme 
Court’s and [the First Circuit’s] jurisprudence in that there exists no rational basis or 
clear policy reasons for their enactment.”210 
 
 201.  Andrés González Berdecía, Puerto Rico Before the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional 
Colonialism in Action, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 80, 127 (2016) (quoting Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1952 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). 
 202.  Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 1948. 
 206.  Id. at 1954 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 207.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 346 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 210.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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Because Congress must establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, 
“[p]rohibiting Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to request Chapter 9 
relief, while allowing all the states to benefit from such power,” is clearly an abuse 
of congressional authority.211 As noted previously in the Supreme Court majority’s 
opinion in Franklin III, the language in the Constitution means what it unequivocally 
states.212 Therefore, the 1984 Amendments are invalid because they are not applied 
uniformly throughout the United States.213 
Additionally, according to Judge Torruella, the 1984 Amendments are invalid 
because they fail the rational basis requirement which is warranted when considering 
the validity of a statute that treats Puerto Rico differently.214 Rational basis review 
requires that “the action of removing Puerto Rico’s power to authorize its 
municipalities to file under Chapter 9 must be allowed if there is any set of 
conceivable reasons rationally related to a legitimate interest of Congress.”215 Here, 
Judge Torruella believes there is no conceivable set of facts rationally related to a 
legitimate purpose of Congress.216 First, there is no legislative record outlining 
Congress’ reasons behind the 1984 Amendments.217 Second, “[t]he 1984 
Amendments deprived Puerto Rico of a fundamental and inherently managerial 
function over its municipalities that has no connection to any articulated or 
discernible Congressional interest.”218 Ultimately, in Judge Torruella’s opinion, the 
1984 Amendments are, again, invalid because there is no rational basis or clear 
congressional policy reason for their enactment. Judge Torruella’s persuasive 
argument that the amendments are invalid all-together provides a unique perspective 
that ultimately leads to the same conclusion as that of the Majority’s holding in 
Franklin III. 
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 347 (Torruella, J., concurring). 
 213.  Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 347 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring) (citing Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and 
the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1141-47 (2012)). 
 214.  Id. at 348 (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 
(1978) (per curiam)); see also Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 348 n.43. 
 215.  Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 348 (Torruella, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 349-50. 
 218.  Id. at 350–53 (citing Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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C. Congress Passes the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act to Address Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis 
On June 30, 2016, President Barrack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”)219 to address 
Puerto Rico’s current debt crisis.220 The bill was passed in the House of 
Representatives on June 9, 2016221 and passed in the Senate on June 29, 2016.222 
PROMESA provides for the creation of a seven-member Oversight Board that has 
control over Puerto Rico’s budget, laws, financial plans, and regulations.223 The 
Oversight Board, which is not accountable to the Puerto Rican government, has the 
power to force the Puerto Rican government “to balance its budget and force a 
restructuring with bondholders and other creditors if an agreement is not reached.”224 
PROMESA also permits the lowering of the federal minimum wage for Puerto Rican 
workers of twenty-four years of age and under.225 
Under the Act, a territory, like Puerto Rico, “may qualify as a debtor if it requests 
the establishment of an Oversight Board [] or has one established for it by Congress, 
and the Oversight Board has issued a restructuring certification for that entity.”226 A 
voluntary bankruptcy case may then be commenced by the Oversight Board filing a 
petition that must comply with PROMESA and Chapter 11 provisions.227 
Additionally, an automatic stay went into effect upon the enactment of PROMESA 
to which courts may grant a relief from stay to prevent irreparable damage to the 
interest of the entity in property.228 
While PROMESA is aimed at alleviating Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, some of its 
provisions have been criticized as not being directly related to fiscal issues.229 An 
example is that the Oversight Board is allowed to “designate energy and 
infrastructure projects as ‘critical’ and bypass[] public review or environmental 
 
 219.  Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat 549 
(2016). 
 220.  Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30, 
2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 
(“Obama said it will provide ‘more stability, better services and greater prosperity over the long term for the 
people of Puerto Rico.’”). 
 221.  Donna Higgins, Experts: Congress must step up after Puerto Rico debt law struck down, Westlaw: 
Bankruptcy Daily Briefing, 2016 WL 3249406. 
 222.  Stephen Nuno, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 29, 
2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-n601291. 
 223.  Guadalupe, supra note 220. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Bankruptcy Law Reports Letter No. 960, Bankr. L. Rep. P 4252625 (2016). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Guadalupe, supra note 220. 
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impact studies.”230 New Jersey Senator Robert Menéndez condemned the bill saying 
“PROMESA exacts a price far too high for relief that is far too uncertain.”231 New 
York Congresswoman Nydia Velázquez voted for the bill despite its shortfalls 
because “there [were] simply no other politically feasible options left on the table.”232 
Furthermore, while many influential Puerto Ricans and additional U.S. Congressmen 
agree with the opposition’s view of the bill, they also agree that the bill is necessary 
to provide a short legal stay so that the Oversight Board can retake Puerto Rico from 
the creditors.233 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Franklin III, the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act was pre-
empted by federal law.234 While the Majority’s method of interpreting the plain 
language of the Bankruptcy Code was the correct course of action,235 additional 
notable interpretations and policy arguments were raised in regards to the 
Bankruptcy Code itself as well as this holding’s implications on the citizens of Puerto 
Rico.236 However, while Puerto Rico and the Dissent may not have found solace 
through the judiciary’s resolution of this matter, Congress’ swift passing of 
PROMESA has provided Puerto Rico with an initial opportunity to address its 
current financial situation.237 
 
 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See supra at note 3 and accompanying text. 
 235.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 236.  See supra Parts III.B, IV. B. 
 237.  See supra Part IV. C. 
